National-Local Networks and Immigration Governance: Policy Distance in South Korea

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In South Korea, a unitary form of government offers an opportunity to examine the policy distance between the national government's stance on immigration and the attitudes of local officials who work for metropolitan-level governments. I examine the impact of local economic market needs on local attitudes towards national immigration policy through the lens of intergovernmental relations (IGR) and Lipsky's concept of bureaucratic discretion. Comparing two cases drawn from local governments in South Korea with dissimilar economic bases but similar levels of local autonomy, I find that economic needs at the local level are linked to local immigration policy. Contrary to expectations, the cases illustrate the relative importance of fiscal autonomy and a new understanding for political autonomy. These cases illustrate the need for caution when applying political and

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institutional theory within new contexts and offer new variables for future investigations of local autonomy.

Keywords: immigration, local politics, policy distance, local autonomy, intergovernmental relations, local labor markets, South Korea

1. Introduction

Immigration, as a policy area of nation-states, is as old an idea as is the idea of the nation-state itself. However, the identification of the outsider, or those who are not full members of the public realm (Arendt, 1958) is much older, and a universal way of defining social groups by categorizing who "belongs" and who does not. There is space where these two ideas overlap, and it has provided fertile ground for discussions of national identity and political rent-seeking, where the mobilization of bias is based upon cleavages defined by "us" and "them" (Schattschneider, 1960). One might argue that many of the discussions of immigration in recent years have taken place within such boundaries (Peberdy, 2009; Gordon, 2016; Jeram, 2014; Holtug, Lippert-Rasmusen & Laegaard, 2009; Laegaard, 2009; Hepburn & Rosie, 2014). However, it can also be a unique policy arena for examining intergovernmental relations, when national policies are carried out at the local level of government (Kingdon, 2003; Choi & Wright, 2004; Koprić, Lalić Novak & Vukojičić Tomić, 2019). This examination provides an opportunity to understand how bureaucratic discretion plays out at the local level of government (Lipsky, 1980; Frederickson, 1980).

East Asia is no stranger to such mobilizations. Long dynastic histories and regional conflicts have merged national identities and created an internal politics that often emphasizes a uniqueness of ethnic origin that is belied by histories of migrations. Migration between East Asian states has been relatively common, as economies have developed at different rates, and the demand for labor creates incentives for movement across national boundaries. In the aftermath of the Second World War and the Korean Conflict, East Asian nations were much more familiar with emigration rather than immigration. As these countries have industrialized, the "brain drain" has diminished somewhat, as first more Japanese, then more Koreans, and now more Chinese, have opted to return home to pursue careers after being educated abroad. But as these nations have developed, they have been faced with the same set of challenges that currently

characterize Western industrialized nations: falling birth rates; increasingly better educated youth (as a proportion of the population); and disproportionately high unemployment rates for those with college degrees (Economist 2017; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP] 2016). This has changed the domestic conversations regarding immigration in a region that has historically been politically averse to welcoming "outsiders". The looming labor shortage is one that has already begun to make its presence felt, as countries in Southeast Asia, like Malaysia and the Philippines, with a labor surplus, have provided a natural impetus for movement in an increasingly globalized economy (The Economist, 2017).

As data from The Economist (2017) indicate, within East Asia, South Korea is in particularly tight territory, facing a need for replacing over 30% of its current workforce by 2030. With the lowest birth rate of any nation within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states, (OECD 2019), South Korea has begun to create national policies over the last ten years specifically designed to address the economic consequences of industrialization and global markets (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. EU National Fertility Rates with Focus on Croatia, Japan, and South Korea, 1970–2017



Source: OECD 2019, Fertility rates, Total, Children/Women, 1970-2017. Social Welfare Statistics: Family Indicators. Data for public use.

Immigration policy can provide an apt vehicle for examining how new policy types offer opportunities for policy innovation within a unitary government structure. Different regions within South Korea rely on different kinds of labor, depending on local market conditions. However, South Korea's government structure poses a problem for studies of national-local relations, since it remains a highly centralized state with a unitary form of government. Much of the intergovernmental literature is rooted in theories that assume a more federated structure, where localities are presumed to have some degree of autonomy (Choi & Wright, 2004). In South Korea, however, the central government has only recently decentralized authority for decision-making to the local level, so such assumptions are not met. However, one may argue that when there is sufficient pressure from local level actors to address specific problems, we can expect to see some deviation from national policy directives. The question that remains unanswered by the intergovernmental and decentralization literature, is what variables are important in explaining local discretion within a unitary structure of government.

Answering such a question has important implications for research currently conducted in nations that are attempting to transition to more decentralized forms of governance (Agranoff, 2004). In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, the questions surrounding decentralization often focus on the form and function, rather than the underlying assumptions about why decentralization might be desirable. Such normative questions cannot be answered by simply examining inputs and outputs between central and local governments: they must be examined within the context of decisions made at both central and local levels as to what is important (salient) and what is not (quiescent) (Edelman, 1967). This requires a more nuanced examination of conditions so that variables not identified by the literature (which tends to be dominated by Western democratic perspectives) might be observed (Pitschel & Bauer, 2009). Only under such an investigation might we hope to uncover what may be missed when applying theories developed within other contexts.

Since South Korea has only recently begun recognizing local government authority (since 1998), there is little systematic data available for assessing how national immigration policy is executed at the local level. So to answer this question, it would be wise to first establish whether there is any difference across local governments in how they approach immigration policy. For these reasons, this research will be exploratory in nature, examining two key cases that are dissimilar in their economic needs and orientations, especially with respect to foreign labor needs, but similar

in size and population characteristics. This will be done in the following stages: first, by establishing the national policy environment in South Korea, including a brief explanation of the intergovernmental landscape, and how this generally impedes local deviation from national policy; second, by explaining the theoretical framework that will be used to assess how local governments carry out national policies and under what conditions exceptions from national policy directives might be expected; third, by examining two specific cases, immigration policies within Busan and Gyeonggi, metropolitan-level governments with dissimilar and similar characteristics as mentioned above, to determine to what extent new variables not indentified in theory may be important in promoting greater efficiencies at the local level by matching local needs while complying with national directives; and then finally, by discussing how such variables may offer a new understanding of policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 2003), and local bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 1980), within an intergovernmental framework.

2. National Policy Environment: A Brief Policy Review

In order to properly engage with the South Korean model of unitary government, some basic review of historical conditions is necessary. South Korea has allowed official local elections since 1991, but nationwide, such elections were not held regularly until 1998, after which time elections for local city councils and mayors have been held every four years (Korea Research Institute for Local Administration [KRILA], 2015). Local governments in South Korea, however, function largely as administrative units that receive both function and structure from the national government, and the administrative structures are tasked with providing continuous public services in key policy areas over time. This link between the national and local administrations is largely budgetary, with relatively little autonomy exercised over budget revenues or expenditures at the local level (KRILA, 2015). Political power is therefore often exercised at the periphery of national policy, rather than over central funding issues (Lee & Tao, 2012; Tao, 2016), and in South Korea, central funding issues are education, national parks and public lands, agriculture, fisheries and forestry, and planning and public transportation (Lee & Tao, 2012). Immigration as a policy area, as mentioned above, is relatively new, and falls

roughly within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Immigration in South Korea defines someone's legal right to reside, work, or participate in South Korean affairs (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Thus, it does not occupy a berth on the ship of ongoing central policy issues. This means that it also can be a political football, getting kicked about on the periphery if there is political rent to be sought.

This peripheral space is also where local-national politics can have the greatest play, where the size and shape of the space is defined by the attention paid to the public issue by the national government. The history of immigration policy in South Korea is short and dynamic, shifting rapidly from periods of emigration to immigration. In the early to mid-1980s, South Korea sent, on average, 30,000 workers abroad each year to work for Korean conglomerates (Kim, 2009). For Korean men, especially those over the age of fifty-five, many have memories of living overseas as foreign laborers, where they spent a good portion of their youth working in occupations known as the 3-D's (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) (Kim, 2009) outside of their home country. However, this changed quickly in the late 1980s, when a construction boom, driven partly by the run-up to South Korea hosting the Olympics in 1988, created new, better-paying jobs that pulled workers out of factories. This caused a labor shortage for industry, estimated by the national government to be a deficit of approximately 100,000 workers, and a country that was a labor exporter became a labor importer virtually overnight (Kim, 2009; Kim & Kwon, 2012).

This sudden shift brought many of the overseas Koreans home, but the need for foreign labor continued (Stratfor, 2017). As a relatively small country surrounded by economic giants (the well-developed economy of Japan, and the waking behemoth, China), South Korea pursued an export-driven, middle-way approach toward economic development (Kim & Kwon, 2012). This meant that large corporations, or the family-run *chaebols*, like Samsung and Hyundai, were constantly looking for ways to keep themselves financially nimble in order to compete internationally. This drove a move toward sub-contracting and market segmentation, which continues to be an issue today. These practices involve large corporations contracting out their less-desirable, labor-intensive work to smaller firms (those with fewer than 30 employees), and retaining higher-paying, white-collar jobs within their corporate umbrella group. Thus, the demand for imported labor generally came from smaller firms, who could no longer draw on rural migrants or younger workers, as the country's youth became better educated (Kim & Kwon, 2012). Korea's first call for migrant labor came from smaller companies who held (or were vying

for) contracts with the titans of the South Korean economy, and the call was for low-skilled workers. And those who were encouraged to answer the call were primarily ethnic Koreans from China (Kim & Kwon, 2012; United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], 2013), or immigrants from other East Asian countries. This situation has become somewhat more diverse over time, for reasons that will be outlined below, but the greatest source of legal migrant workers to Korea remains those who have ethnic ties to the Korean peninsula (see Table 1).

Table 1. *Foreign Residents by Country of Origin, 2014–2018*

Country of Origin	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China	898,654	955,871	1,016,607	1,018,074	1,070,566
(Ethnic Korean Chinese)[1]	(590,856)	(626,655)	(627,004)	(679,729)	(708,082)
Vietnam	129,973	136,758	149,384	169,738	196,633
Thailand	94,314	93,348	100,860	153,259	197,764
United States	136,663	138,660	140,222	143,568	151,018
Uzbekistan	43,852	47,103	54,490	62,870	68,433
Philippines	53,538	54,977	56,980	58,480	60,139
Cambodia	38,395	43,209	45,832	47,105	47,012
Mongolia	24,561	30,527	35,206	45,744	46,286
Russia	14,425	19,384	32,372	44,851	54,064
Japan	49,152	47,909	51,297	53,670	60,878
Indonesia	46,945	46,538	47,606	45,328	47,366
Nepal	26,790	30,185	34,108	36,627	40,456
Taiwan	31,200	30,002	34,003	36,168	41,306
Sri Lanka	26,057	26,678	27,650	26,916	25,828
Canada	24,353	25,177	26,107	25,692	25,934
Myanmar	15,921	19,209	22,455	24,902	28,074
Bangladesh	14,644	14,849	15,482	16,066	16,641
Pakistan	11,209	11,987	12,639	12,697	13,275

[1] The count for Ethnic Koreans is included in the total count for Chinese immigrants, so it is not reflected in the overall total.

India	10,196	10,414	10,515	11,244	11,945
Australia	12,468	12,303	13,870	13,008	14,279
Hong Kong	7,398	7,275	7,180	6,727	6,972
United Kingdom	10,762	13,506	16,728	13,303	12,119
New Zealand	4,593	4,744	4,906	4,884	5,072
Other	71,555	78,906	92,942	109,577	125,547
Total	**1,797,618**	**1,899,519**	**2,049,441**	**2,180,498**	**2,367,607**

Source: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Republic of Korea, 2018. Data compiled by the author from source.

Agreement about who should come to Korea and for how long was not reached at the national level until 2003 (Park, 2017). At this time the trainee programs initially offered by the central government under the Kim Young-Sam administration in 1994 to control the influx of migrants from countries outside of East Asia were finally ended. The programs had been established to regulate the number and origin of migrants, but since so very few migrants were allowed to stay legally for any period of time under the program, employers would often "forget" to renew visas, thus leading to burgeoning numbers of migrant workers remaining long past their initial visa period (Torneo, 2016; Torneo and Yang, 2015). In 2002, nearly 70% of South Korea's foreign workforce were staying in the country illegally, which indicated that no one's needs were being met; neither the companies' that required foreign labor to survive nor the foreign workers' employed under often exploitative conditions (Park, 2017). Many of the smaller firms, who needed labor to keep up with the fast pace of growth, would offer temporary positions to visitors from Southeast and South Asia without applying for permission from the government, since rules were arcane and quotas were severely limited. This meant that most migrant labor entered the country on a tourist visa and then simply overstayed the limits of the visa (Park, 2017). In 2003, the outgoing Kim Dae-Jung administration tackled the thorny issue of immigration and created the Employment Permit System (EPS), which offered illegal migrants the opportunity to enroll in a guest worker program for the first time. Thus between 2002 and 2003, the population of legal immigrants jumped by 57.2 percent (Park, 2017).

Since that time, the government has turned to immigration policy to address a number of growing concerns with the Korean labor market. The most pressing issues at present are the rock-bottom birth rate, and the

need for two different types of labor: unskilled, since young Koreans are increasingly unwilling to take positions that their parents deem "unfit given their level of education"; and highly skilled in professional areas (finance, research and design, and professions requiring high fluency in English) (Oh et al., 2012). For technical fields, the rate of vacancy requiring foreign professionals to compensate for gaps in the local labor markets can vary considerably. In 2012, for example, the shortage rate for technical workers in the steel industry was over five times the rate in the semiconductor industry (6.3% to 1.7%, respectively) (Oh et al., 2012).

Since the labor market has different needs, the national government has come up with two major programs for bringing in and managing foreign labor: the General Employment Permit Visa Program; and the Working Visit Visa Program. The first targets non-Korean low-skilled or unskilled labor from fifteen approved countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam (Ministry of Justice, 2007). This group of migrant labor is generally given an E-9 visa, and must pass a Korean language proficiency test in order to qualify for employment. The latter is for ethnic Koreans born or living overseas, who are willing to take unskilled labor jobs, and who are generally issued H-2 visas. Both were designed to be short-term programs, giving those who met the selection criteria visas of limited duration (for the General Employment Permit Visa Program, one year or less, with the possibility of renewal or extension, but with a three-year cap; the latter up to 22 months, with the possibility of renewal or extension, but with a five-year cap). This short-term focus ensured that the migrant community did not set down roots, and this has led to difficulty for some employers in keeping high quality workers (Oh et al., 2012).

In 2012, at the end of the Lee Myeong Bak administration, the problem of continuity was addressed with the introduction of the "Sincere Worker Re-Entry System", which allowed for longer stays for "sincere" workers. A sincere worker was an E-9 visa holder identified by his or her employer as a crucial part of the employer's labor force. The influx of workers from this category can be seen in Table 2. Over time, the number of returning workers has risen, which means that the average stay for what used to be considered a "temporary" worker has increased to well over five years for unskilled labor. As of 2018, the Korean government still prohibits foreign workers in these categories from bringing family members to the country, so there is still a reluctance to allow immigrants who are not ethnically Korean to settle in Korea.

Table 2. *Low-Skilled Workers in South Korea by Visa Type after Commencement of "Sincere Worker" Program*

Year	E-9 Visa Holders	"Sincere" Workers	H-2 Visa Holders	Total Authorized Foreign Workers
2011	234,295	----	303,368	1,117,481
2012	230,237	1,853	238,765	1,120,599
2013	246,695	7,021	240,178	1,219,192
2014	270,569	8,834	282,670	1,377,965
2015	276,042	12,090	285,342	1,465,873

Source: Ministry of Justice (2017). Immigration Service Employment Permit System. Data compiled by the author from source.

This ambivalence towards foreign workers and immigration is not uniform. There are generational differences, as mentioned previously, and in rural parts of Korea, the importance of foreign brides in overcoming the gender imbalances in a country that prefers male children cannot be overstated. Since the 1990s, foreign spouses have comprised roughly 13% of all immigrants, and this category has often dominated policy planning and budgetary concerns. For example, in the metropolitan city of Incheon, foreign spouses make up 20% of all foreigners residing in the city, but they receive 50% of the budget for immigrant-related purposes (Oh et al., 2012; Han, 2010). The rise in the number of children who are born to a non-Korean parent has been steady, leading to a relatively new focus on what the government calls "multiculturalism" (Kim, 2010; Watson, 2012). The emphasis on creating more Korean families rather than on issues related to migrant labor can be seen by examining policies over time, as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3. *History of Multiculturalism Policies in South Korea*

Year	Multiculturalism-related policies and laws
1988	Approved participants from socialist countries entering the nation for the 1988 Seoul Olympics.
1991	Introduced local subsidiaries training system for firms that wished to hire migrant workers.
1992	Joined the UN, established diplomatic ties with China, liberalized overseas travel.
1994	Introduced the industrial technology training system nationwide.
1995	Declared Globalisation (by the civilian government) as a desirable policy.

1996	Joined the OECD.
1997	Adopted the bilineal jus sanguinis principle following the constitutional discordance adjudication on the patrilineal jus sanguinis of the Nationality Act.
1999	Enacted the Overseas Koreans Act.
2001	Set up guidelines on guaranteeing the right to education of illegal immigrant workers' children (primary school).
2003	Simplified international marriages by abrogating the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Korea and China.
2004	Presented the cultural vision of the nation through Creative Korea by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, abolished the industrial training system, implemented the employment permit system.
2005	Raised the issue of social integration against polarization (by Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion), studied the policy direction for establishing multi-cultural policies and cultural support strategies, guaranteed the right to education of undocumented immigrant children according to the recommendation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (secondary school).
2006	Held high-level immigrant policy meeting, adopted the Social integration support policy and Resident foreigners support ordinance, enacted the Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea, established the education support plan for the children from multi-cultural families, set up the National Center for Multi-cultural Education in the Seoul National University.
2007	Launched the Korea Immigration Service of the Ministry of Justice, enacted the Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea.
2008	Enacted the Multi-cultural Families Support Act, established the Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, announced the strategy for attracting global high-quality human resources (by the National Competitiveness Committee), announced the measure for extending the customized support for each stage of life cycle for multi-cultural families, abolished the system on the head of family, enacted the regulation on the social integration program for immigrants and the operation of that program.
2009	Made the recommendation on guaranteeing the right to education for undocumented immigrant children (secondary education), organized the multi-cultural forum for members of the National Assembly for enacting the framework act on multiculturalism, launched the Social Integration Committee, implemented the system of completing the courses of the Korea Immigration & Integration Program (KIIP).
2010	Established the Basic Plan for Policies to Support Multi-cultural Families, expressed opinions on the partial revision of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Regulation of Marriage Brokerage Agency.
2011	Made the recommendation on improving the human rights of stateless persons due to a sham marriage.

Source: Adapted from Kang and Yoo (2011, p. 46), by the author to focus on immigration-related policies.

As outlined in Table 3, there is often a reshaping of immigration policy during the last year of the presidency. Since Korean presidents are term-limited (one term of five years), the last year is the opportunity to pursue policies that may be unpopular but necessary for pursuing broader public interest goals. The "lame duck" status of the last year is not as debilitating for the Korean presidency as it may be elsewhere, since the executive branch in Korea is relatively powerful, and can act unilaterally in a number of ways. Border protection and national economic concerns fall into these categories, and thus immigration is a logical area of focus. What is interesting about immigration as a policy issue is the lack of salience in any political party's platform within South Korea. There is virtual silence about immigration as a policy area, outside of some concerns with the treatment of defectors and refugees from North Korea (Park, 2017).

3. The Role of Local Governments and Intergovernmental Relations in Shaping Immigration Policy

Since immigration policy is still evolving at the national level, it has not received its own space in the central government's organizational universe (see Figure 2). Technically, policy is centralized in the Immigrants' Policy Committee under the Ministry of Justice, and the different programmatic approaches are dispersed throughout the national government (Korean Immigration Service, 2014). This means that policies are farmed out to the ministries that may be best equipped to implement the particulars of the policy in question. So, for example, support for multicultural families is sent to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, while the welfare of immigrants and their children is dealt with through the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and Immigrants' Settlement Support is done through the Ministry of the Interior and local governments. Thus a single issue, such as education of children from multicultural families in public schools might not have a clear ministerial home.

Such deconstruction is also evident at the local level of government, which often mirrors, at least structurally, the national level, as one might expect in a unitary form of government. City governments have central administrations, but most services are provided at the district level (구 or *gu*). This is because the *gu* office is responsible for registering residents, and residency confers access to certain amenities and services, such as public school registration. In this regard, immigrants are treated exactly like their

Figure 2. *Ministerial Jurisdiction over Immigration Policy in South Korea*



Source: Ministry of Justice, 2015. p. 3. For public use.

Korean neighbors, which can prove to be both helpful (everyone faces exactly the same circumstances), and impossible (without prior knowledge of rules or mastery of the Korean language, immigrants are often not privy to the same information their neighbors have). Thus issues that are unique to immigrants may not be addressed directly by the city central government, but rather by the district that happens to have foreign residents (Incheon City Government, 2015).

Hence immigration policy falls into a nether region within the national policy rubric, where we might expect the central government's guidelines for how to address immigration issues to vary considerably, from broad and incomplete, to highly focused and narrow, when certain areas of policy are judged to be more pressing (see Table 3). Local governments, which often find themselves on the front lines of service delivery, therefore become the *de facto* arbiters of what immigration policy is in South Korea. The street-level bureaucrats, as Lipsky (1980) might argue, are those civil servants serving in the *gu* offices, who decide how to construct policy based upon the kinds of clients they serve.

Intergovernmental relations (IGR) in East Asia, and specifically in South Korea, as outlined by Choi and Wright (2004), have evolved over time, shifting from a heavy-handed, highly centralized, and militaristic governing approach to a more politically decentralized and democratic approach that relies increasingly on local governments as partners rather than pawns (Choi & Wright, 2004, p. 3). According to the IGR model, there

are institutional and behavioral factors that come into play in determining the type of the relationship between the center and the peripheral governments. The relationship between the central and local governments in South Korea is by no means equal, as illustrated by the budgetary control still exercised by the central government. With discretion over only 25 percent of their budgets, local governments have limited opportunities to flex their policy muscles.

The institutional factors from IGR include the legal framework that binds national and local officials, e.g. constitutional or legislative tenets. The behavioral factors encompass those variables that may affect "the attitudes and actions of public officials … operating in other political jurisdictions" (Choi & Wright, 2004, p. 2). Of particular interest is the fiscal relationship between the national and local governments, and the interaction with other institutions, such as political parties. However, the assumptions of this model include a more autonomous role for local governments than is generally the case in a unitary environment (Tao, 2016). If local governments lack fiscal autonomy, then the IGR model posits that other institutions, like political parties, and behavioral factors, such as the prevalence (or lack) of networks between officials at different government levels, become more important (Agranoff, 2004). In studies of newly decentralized governments, where self-rule has become possible, fiscal autonomy is generally recognized as crucial to the exercise of bureaucratic discretion.

However, there is little discussion of how local governments implement national policy when there are clear differences between the central and the local levels. These differences might be attitudinal, where the needs of the local community differ from those recognized and supported at the national level. The differences might also be institutional, where the ruling political party at the national level may not be as well represented at the local level. In his discussion of newly decentralized nations, Agranoff outlines clear distinctions between devolution of authority, where self-rule of a sub-unit of the national government is granted, and power sharing, as outlined by Elazar (1987), which is often associated with the IGR model (Agranoff, 2004, p. 28) and federalist systems. The expectations of both rest heavily on the two issues of fiscal autonomy and political independence. If neither is present, then the local government will not be expected to deviate much from national directives.

In South Korea, the unitary structure of government dominates discussions of local autonomy, with many scholars pointing to the lack of fiscal autonomy in particular as a measure of centralization (Lee & Tao, 2012; Moon, 1999; Kwon, 2003; Kim, 2016; Choi & Wright, 2004). However,

there is also acknowledgement that the level of fiscal autonomy varies considerably across local government units. If fiscal autonomy is measured as the ratio of own-source revenues to total revenues, the range can be as broad as 21 (very low autonomy) to 60 (medium-high autonomy) (Choi & Wright, 2004). Thus, one might argue that in a locality with higher fiscal autonomy, there will be a higher likelihood that local policies may diverge somewhat from national policies, even within a unitary system. The chance of this happening in a policy area that is within the national government's zone of indifference should also be high.

Additionally, South Korean scholars point to the development of democratic institutions and norms as a potential catalyst for greater local autonomy. As Choi and Wright (2004) state: "The extension of voting for local councils and executive heads certainly assisted in associating democracy with local autonomy. This link seems solidified and indirectly supported by the now-established pattern of open and competitive national elections … since 1987" (p. 10). This idea is further supported by scholarship that highlights South Korean "regionalism", where different regions of the country show strong support for particular political parties (Lee & Hwang, 2012). Thus, when voter turnout in particular regions is high, the national ruling party (the winner of the presidency) may shift, causing realignments with local governments that either support or oppose the new ruling party. This has happened many times in the local and national elections since 1987 (Lee & Hwang, 2012), which means that there is an opportunity to see whether political parties can either enforce or weaken national policy initiatives at the local level.

4. Research Questions, Design, Data Collection, and Expectations

The literature on IGR and local autonomy makes clear that we should expect local governments to respond to fiscal and institutional constraints set at the national level. But to what degree are local variables important in pushing policy behavior either toward or away from national directives? And which local variables are important? The IGR literature argues that many variables come into play at the local level, such as bureaucratic discretion (for administrators), political party affiliation (for elected officials), and policy issues that have fiscal consequences (Choi & Wright, 2004). However, these are expectations derived from a largely Western

(e.g. U.S.-based) set of institutions. Are there other variables that we might be missing if we are using these models in non-Western settings, like South Korea?

The answers to such questions cannot be given by simply applying an IGR framework to South Korean national-local networks. Discovering new variables requires a more qualitative approach to investigation, or a "case-oriented" approach (Ragin, 1987). The key to this approach is summed up as follows:

> *[T]he relations between the parts of a whole are understood within the context of the whole, not within the context of general patterns of co-variation between variables characterizing the members of a population of comparable units. Second, causation is understood conjuncturally. Outcomes are analyzed in terms of intersections of conditions, and it is usually assumed that any of several combinations of conditions might produce a certain outcome.* (p. x).

If we investigate two South Korean local government cases that are similar across variables assumed important within the context of the IGR framework, yet that exhibit different outcomes, we may determine, to some extent, viable local variables that help explain, either alone or in conjunction, the differences across cases. Such identification may prove valuable for other researchers attempting to investigate local government behavior within the context of autonomy. It may also help those who are interested in how IGR works within a unitary system of government that is in transition toward a more decentralized form.

To examine how local governments navigate policy implementation in a unitary system, we are looking within a policy area that is unsettled at the national level as determined above: immigration. We will examine and compare two cases that represent different points on the spectrum of conditions for the two most important variables of interest as identified in the literature: fiscal autonomy and political autonomy.

In South Korea, local governments are divided into categories according to size and recognized status from the national government. Metropolitan city level governments (광역시 or *gwangyeoksi*) are those that have more than one million residents, and their status is identical to provincial governments. Not all local governments with more than one million residents are designated as metropolitan cities: the local government must petition for this status, and be granted the status by the national government. There are currently eight (8) metropolitan cities including Seoul, which

has special status as the capital city (and by far, the largest population center in South Korea with approximately 10 million residents). There are eight (8) provincial governments and the special provincial government of Jeju Province. All together this brings the total up to seventeen (17) local governments with some autonomy in making policy decisions.

Case selection was determined in part by establishing two local jurisdictions with similar political alignments with the national ruling party (currently the Democratic Party of South Korea, 민주당 or *minjudang*), and similar levels of fiscal autonomy. The latter variable proved to be more definitive in case selection, as illustrated in Table 4. Seoul City and Sejong City were eliminated from consideration because of their special status as capital cities; they have statutory and regulatory powers that other local governments do not have, so measures of local autonomy would not be comparable. For similar reasons, Jeju Autonomous Province was also not included. Since cities and provinces often have different needs of their workforces, choosing one from each would help us to identify a broader range of variables when local autonomy might prove important to determining local policy decisions. Table 4 is therefore divided into two parts: the top half contains cities, and the bottom half contains provinces, but all are treated at equal administrative levels by the national government.

The measure of local political autonomy is the proportion of local council seats held by the ruling party in the last set of local elections in June of 2018 (National Election Commission, 2018), and the measure of fiscal autonomy is the ratio of local revenues to national revenues in the local budget, averaged over a three-year period (Kim, 2016). Therefore, the higher the measure of political autonomy, the greater the expectation that the local government will mirror national policies; the higher the measure of fiscal autonomy, the lower the expectation that the local government will conform to national policy expectations. As the data in Table 4 demonstrates, we could choose pairs based on their deviation from the group as a whole (dissimilarities, or unlikes, using Ragin's (1987) terminology), or on their convergence with the group (similarities). For example, Daegu and Gyeongsangbuk (highlighted boxes) have similarly low political autonomy scores, since both districts hold a sizeable majority of opposition party representatives. However, Daegu is actually located adjacent to Gyeongsangbuk, and historically, the two share political cultures as well as economic conditions. So using such a pair for comparison would probably be less fruitful than choosing a pair that has more distance between the cases. For these reasons, the closest match across both variables is between Busan (among cities) and Gyeonggi (among provinces).

Table 4. *Political and Fiscal Measures of Local Autonomy, Metropolitan-Level Governments*

Local Government	Political Autonomy	Fiscal Autonomy
Seoul	0.93	84.33
Sejong	0.94	48.07
Busan	0.87	52.03
Incheon	0.92	62.97
Daegu	**0.17**	**46.87**
Daejeon	0.95	50
Gwangju	0.96	41.47
Ulsan	0.77	61.77
Gangwon	0.76	21.53
Gyeonggi	0.95	55.8
Jeollabuk	0.92	12.58
Jeollanam	0.93	16.8
Chungcheongnam	0.79	36.47
Chungcheongbuk	0.88	27.53
Gyeongsangnam	0.59	36.23
Gyeongsangbuk	**0.15**	**23.83**

Source: Data compiled by the author from KOSIS (2019).

4.1. Assessing Variables for Comparison

In order to determine the nature of immigration policy focus at the local level, we must first decide how such policy can be assessed. Each metropolitan city and provincial government produce their own guidelines for foreigners residing within their jurisdictions, and these offer a view of where a particular local government focuses its attention with respect to immigrant issues. The variation in guidelines and how they are made available to different immigrant groups is available online as part of South

Korea's Government-to-Citizen initiative (or G2C). Local governments provide their official information through individually tailored websites.

Our two cases are quite distinct. The City of Busan is a major port city on the southern coast of Korea, and Gyeonggi Province is the province surrounding Seoul City and Incheon City, which borders the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and North Korea. These two jurisdictions represent quite distinct economic, political, and social areas. Busan faces Japan and serves as the major point of contact for trade and tourism; Gyeonggi serves as a bedroom community to the greater Seoul/Incheon metropolitan area and also serves as the gateway to both China, on its west coast, and North Korea. By focusing on these two local governments, a preliminary model for future research can be built.

In order to gather data from both jurisdictions, each website was evaluated to ascertain the breadth of information offered. This was done using the following framework for assessment: 1) what policy areas were covered (e.g. how many and how diverse); 2) what was the depth of information provided; 3) were people encouraged to visit local offices or call for more information, or was the information provided online sufficient; 4) were people offered a way to interact online so that more information could be obtained; and 5) how user-friendly were the sites (e.g. was information offered in multiple languages; was the same information offered in each language; were opportunities to sign up for information on events, etc. made available on-line)? This information provides three separate measures of local government responsiveness: policy breadth (does the local government have plans in place to address the different areas of immigrant needs); policy distance (how much difference lies between the local government's approach to immigration and that of the national government); and responsiveness (how responsive does the local government appear to be towards its immigrant community needs). These different constructs are outlined in Table 5.

Table 5. *Constructs and Potential Variables*

Construct Type	Construct	Possible Variable
Dependent	Policy breadth	Policy areas represented at the local level
	Policy adaptation	How local policy differs from national policy
	Peer/horizontal alignment	Deviation from peer groups (similar across autonomy variables)

Independent	Political/vertical alignment	Proportion of Council Members belonging to Presidential Party
	Economic Influence	Proportion of industries that hire foreigners
		Types of industry that hire foreigners
	Social influence	Proportion of foreigners living in jurisdiction

Source: Author

Data for local government immigration policy was collected from each local government website developed specifically to serve its foreign residents. Busan Metropolitan City (the second largest city in South Korea at 3.4 million people (KOSIS, 2018)); and, Gyeonggi Province, which is the most heavily populated province in South Korea, containing roughly 12.6 million people (KOSIS, 2018), are two of the most heavily populated areas in the country, and as mentioned, they are located at different points of entry to South Korea: Busan is in the south, and has traditionally been the gateway from Japan and parts of southeast Asia. Gyeonggi Province is in the north, and is the traditional entry point from China and more western parts of Asia (Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan). Busan is a metropolitan city, and therefore has little jurisdiction over issues such as agriculture or forestry; its economic concerns are shipping, fishing, construction, and manufacturing. It has also been losing population, just as Gyeonggi has grown. Gyeonggi Province contains large expanses of undeveloped rural areas, yet also serves as a bedroom community to the ever-growing population of workers in Seoul and Incheon, so its economic concerns are more varied. An in-depth examination of their respective internet websites for foreign residents offers insight into how they see themselves addressing immigration policy at the local level.

4.1.1. Busan Metropolitan City. The Busan Metropolitan government has two main subsidiaries that address the needs of foreign residents: the first is the Busan Foundation for International Cooperation (BFIC), an umbrella organization that covers all things "foreign" that live or work in Busan (Busan Metropolitan Government, 2018); the second is the Busan Foreign Workers Support Center (BFWSC), whose mandate is focused entirely on foreign workers and their needs. What is immediately striking about the difference between the two sets of services are the languages that are offered for the two websites: the BFIC can be read in English, Japanese, and simple and complex Chinese; the BFWSC can be read in Korean, English, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Burmese. Second, there is far more information available on the first site

(BFIC), than on the second (BFWSC). The latter only contains directions on how to get to the physical office, and outlines its official purpose: "to recover the rights of migrant workers by solving the problems migrant workers get while living and working in Korea, through counseling and to contribute social integration of Korea by improving human rights of migrant workers and communication between migrant workers and Koreans" (Busan Metropolitan Government, 2018). The first site contains multiple services that might be useful to someone living in Korea: information on housing, banking, how to master the transportation system, language services for non-native speakers, medical services, education, sports activities, and safety. The first site also contains all information geared towards "multicultural families", which apparently does not include any of the immigrant groups from Southeast Asia that are included in the second site. The exception is for Chinese from mainland China (simplified Chinese).

4.1.2. Local Immigration Officials and Bureaucratic Discretion. Lipsky (1980) noted that officials on the front lines of service delivery in large, bureaucratic organizations often shaped public opinion of government in important ways. They were able to do so because of the bureaucratic paradox; as the public agency increased in size, the likelihood that "street level" bureaucrats would receive conflicting orders from higher levels within the organization increased. When the policy area in question was politically salient, but the conditions of the clientele remained constant, Lipsky found that street level bureaucrats often exercised their own discretion in carrying out policy initiatives. This is something we might expect to see as an important variable in local immigration policy implementation in a unitary system. However, South Korea engages in a practice that reduces the potential for bureaucratic discretion: local civil servants are rotated on a regular basis between positions, so even if a local official cultivates useful policy practices, these may not remain once they are rotated out of their position (Kim, 2016). Likewise, if a local official is particularly poor in their execution of policy practices, they may not be in their position long enough to either help or harm their clientele. This practice increases the importance of national policy at the local level, and is one tool that reduces the exercise of local bureaucratic discretion.

4.1.3. Gyeonggi Province. As expected, the bulk of services provided to foreigners by Gyeonggi Province is related to multicultural families, and with a misrepresentation of the law on their site (Gyeonggi Provincial Government, 2018). According to the National Assembly (see Table 3), in 1997, laws regarding who was eligible to become a Korean national through birth were amended to include children whose fathers were not Korean; previously, all

children with non-Korean fathers were prohibited from being recognized as Korean nationals. Given the history of foreign occupation in Korea, and in particular the practice of "comfort women" by Japanese soldiers, legal institutions bore the marks of this occupation for many decades (Kim, 2010; Kim, 2018). But for Gyeonggi to continue this tradition speaks to its highly conservative nature, that runs counter to its current political configurations.

Additionally, the range of services offered is relatively limited, focusing for the most part on integrating families into a Korean system, in compliance with "multiculturalism". However, the range of languages offered to foreign workers in Gyeonggi is much greater: English, Chinese (simplified), Japanese, Vietnamese, Mongolian, Nepali, Indonesian, Thai, Uzbek, Bengali, Khmer, Sinhala, Russian, and Burmese. There is no information, for example, on housing, safety, or sports, which is to be expected in a more suburban/rural environment. But the range of nationalities represented demonstrates the breadth of possible vocations that are being filled by foreigners within Gyeonggi Province, ranging from professional services to manufacturing and manual labor in rural areas that is no longer sought by Koreans. This differs substantially from the more limited range indicated within Busan. Additionally, the combined information for multicultural families and that available for workers offers more specific, work-related data for foreign residents than does Busan's website.

4.1.4. Data Measurement and Analysis. As illustrated in Table 5, there are three separate potential dependent variables to test for different types of responsiveness to immigrant populations that also help shed light on local autonomy. In order to see whether there is responsiveness at the local level to changes in conditions, these variables for local governments should ideally be captured over time. However, since local governments do not archive their data, capturing changes in policy over time requires capturing published changes within the public domain. This is one area where the South Korean government's activities remain relatively opaque. As rules change, which can be done by local officials if they obtain consent from national administrators, how rules change is documented in an *ad hoc* way. A local official creates a document that instructs future officials in how to carry out the new rule. It does not necessarily reference the old rule, or why the old rule required modification.[2] Thus a snapshot in time is the sum of what can be captured with respect to policy changes.

[2] Interview with local government official (2018). Incheon National University, Incheon, Republic of Korea.

To examine how this might look, Figure 3 and Table 6 present the data from Busan and Gyeonggi together so that differences may be examined. Figure 3 looks at the political parties and representation in both the executive and legislative branches of local. The first item to note is that both jurisdictions were part of the "Blue Wave" of 2018, where the former ruling party of impeached President Park Geun Hye was soundly trounced at the polls throughout local government elections nationwide. The Democratic Party took both the executive and legislative branches from the former New World Party (*Saenuri Dang)* in Busan and in Gyeonggi, by surprisingly large margins. This demonstrates the strength of the national government over local politics in South Korea, despite decades of attempts at decentralization. Changes at the top are generally followed by changes at the local level, and this applies equally to partisan politics and administrative behavior. What is especially noteworthy about this partisan shift is the focus on labor policy. The new ruling Democratic Party places heavy emphasis on providing employment security for labor, and this sometimes puts the party at odds with immigrant advocacy groups who represent imported labor, especially if that labor is viewed as replacing native Koreans.

Figure 3. Comparison of Busan and Gyeonggi Political Characteristics

Legislative and Executive Party Representation:

● – Democratic Party ● – Liberty Party



Busan City Council (2018 elections)

Busan Mayor,
Keo-don OH (2018)

Source: By 사:밥풀떼기 – parliament diagram tool부산광역시의회 정당, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=70455755



Gyeonggi Provincial Council
(2018 elections)

Gyeonggi Governor,
Jae-myung LEE (2018)[3]

Source: By – parliament diagram tool, 퍼블릭 도메인, Public Domain. https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=70459215

Given that there is little political distinction between Busan and Gyeonggi and the national administration, we might expect relatively similar approaches to immigration policy. However, as demonstrated by the differences noted in the websites earlier, this is not the case. Therefore, it would be interesting to compare the other independent variables identified in Table 5 to see whether the distinction in policy approaches lies in the social and/or economic realms. Table 6 provides a cursory comparison.

Table 6. *Social and Economic Factors Regarding Immigrant Communities in Busan and Gyeonggi*

Local Government	Total Population	Foreign Population (%)	Rural Population (%)	Workers in Agriculture (%)
Busan	3,519,401	43,734 (1.2)	20,944 (0.5)	7083 (0.2)
Gyeonggi	1,235,7830	452,046 (3.7)	350,200 (2.8)	243,957 (2.0)
Local Government	**Workers in Fishing (%)**	**Workers in Forestry (%)**	**Workers in Manufacturing (%)**	**Policy Types (Number)**
Busan	6132 (0.2)	421 (0.00)	144,758 (4.1)	8
Gyeonggi	3107 (0.03)	4082 (0.03)	884,397 (7.2)	14

Source: Data compiled by the author from Korean Statistical Information Service, 2018

[3] Editor's note: pictures published upon author' request.

When placed side by side, we can immediately see the difference that numbers make for policy diversity. In Gyeonggi, where foreign workers make up a much greater proportion of the overall population, and where the relative importance of agriculture and manufacturing is much higher than in Busan, the local government has responded by creating more services and by trying to accommodate a broader range of foreign workers than is the case in Busan. Although foreign labor still represents a relatively small proportion of the labor force in South Korea, thus providing very little threat to the local workforce in terms of job replacement, the national government still views foreign labor as a potentially destabilizing force (Jang, 2015). It is still remarkably difficult to get a visa to work inside South Korea, with industries often petitioning the national government directly for leniency in applying strict entrance requirements on potential workers. Thus local governments have had to adapt national policies to address local circumstances, as demonstrated by the different approaches taken by the two cases outlined here. So even in a unitary government, centralized rules can be customized at the local level.

Additionally, since both these cases have relatively high levels of fiscal autonomy (over 50% local revenue), and relatively low political autonomy, the customizing that has taken place seems to indicate that fiscal autonomy is more important than political autonomy. This has certainly been a key argument in the decentralization and local autonomy literature: without local fiscal autonomy, true decentralization (and the efficiencies expected of it) cannot be realized (Agranoff, 2006). But whether it is an equal partner to institutional variables is a difficult question to answer, since the two are often intertwined. A locality may not have the right to decide whether it can raise local revenue if the national institutional structure does not allow it. This has certainly been the case in South Korea.

However, the cases here seem to indicate that there is an additional set of variables that we should consider when investigating local autonomy and whether it carries more benefits than costs. Traditionally, the rights that must be given at the national level to subnational governing jurisdictions cover four areas of decision-making: 1) time (when can revenue be raised); 2) purpose (for what can revenue be raised); 3) scale (how much revenue can be raised); and 4) process (how can revenue be raised) (Agranoff, 2006, p. 43). Of these four, local governments in South Korea exercise relatively little control, except perhaps for scale. Thus, any autonomy in the generation of revenue is closely tied to a local government's economic circumstances. In South Korea, this is a perennial thorn in the side of the national government. One of its most consistent points for

political conflict is the perception of political favoritism, where the party in power offers more resources to its political friends, including those in industry. Such perceptions are holdovers from Korea's history as developmental state (Woo-Cummings, 1999), but they are strong enough to color popular opinion, and there is certainly ample evidence that the national government considers the perception of equity across jurisdictions to be important (Kim, 2016). So, politically, allowing economic differences to flourish from region to region can be a risky undertaking. Thus we might expect to see some paradoxical behavior with respect to political and economic variables at the local levels. This may be especially true within a policy area such as immigration, where the national aims of labor policy may contradict (in political rhetoric) the economic goals of local governments.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

In general, the current administration of President Moon Jae-in is ambivalent about immigration and foreign labor. In a surprising move in 2018, the government decided to uphold a controversial 2016 court ruling that found bilingual education to be detrimental to children learning their native language (Ghani, 2018). In a reversal of a decades-old policy, the government has banned the teaching of English prior to the start of third grade of elementary schools. The court ruling was based primarily on highly contested testimony that justified the delay by arguing that foreign language acquisition at an early age pushed other, more important subjects to the side. Since the average amount of time elementary public school children spend in English language classes is approximately one hour per week, opponents of the measure argued that this was more a symbolic policy gesture than one which would truly affect the learning outcomes.

The examination of the two cases here illustrates the importance of fiscal autonomy in allowing local jurisdictions the policy space necessary to address local needs more efficiently. However, they also highlight ways in which political institutions, like parties, can mask differences that would otherwise prove detrimental to national cohesiveness. This political solidarity allows for some flexibility at the local level in areas that are not of major interest to the ruling party. The shortcomings of this examination are clear. These are two cases out of a population of seventeen, and thus

may not represent, in a generalizable way, the story of local autonomy in South Korea.

However, the purpose of this research was to establish a foundation for future efforts to explore further. By highlighting the importance of fiscal autonomy and policy distance, the case studies presented here offer food for thought in the larger questions of how local autonomy might play out in other arenas. These findings may be especially important for other unitary governments attempting to transition to more decentralized models of governance.

Currently, local governments in South Korea are still trying to provide services for their foreign residents because they recognize the economic realities embedded in an export-oriented economy (Lee, 2015). And herein lies Korea's unique predicament. It is a small nation, relative to its neighbors. Its very existence depends on balancing its relationships with the United States and China, its two largest trading partners, and the two nations most responsible for its security and stability in the region. Many see it as a pawn in a larger game of chess, but the South Koreans themselves struggle mightily to define their own place in this "bad neighborhood". This requires reimagining its own identity on a regular basis, maintaining some continuity between the past and the future. Language and culture are two of its strongest tools for creating a cohesive notion of Korean identity. Political uniformity, at least on the surface, is another. But as this examination of national-local conditions demonstrates, there is room for flexibility, especially when the economic demands of the population require it. As long as immigration does not threaten the national identity, foreign workers may continue to find their place within South Korea.

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NATIONAL-LOCAL NETWORKS AND IMMIGRATION GOVERNANCE: POLICY DISTANCE IN SOUTH KOREA

Summary

The ability to regulate the flow of goods, capital and people across borders is one of the defining characteristics of nation-state political power. But there is not always agreement between the central government and local officials as to the desirability of immigration, where local governments may desire greater, or fewer, numbers of immigrants, depending on the local economy and labor needs. In South Korea, a unitary form of government offers an opportunity to examine the policy distance between the national government's stance on immigration based on the politics of the ruling party, and the attitudes of local officials who work for metropolitan-level governments (those with a population of one million or more). I look at the impact of local economic market needs on local attitudes towards national immigration policy through the lens of intergovernmental relations and Lipsky's concept of bureaucratic discretion. Comparing two cases drawn from local governments in South Korea with dissimilar economic bases but similar levels of local autonomy, I find that economic needs at the local level are addressed

by local approaches to immigration policy. Contrary to expectations, the cases illustrate the relative importance of fiscal autonomy and a new understanding for political autonomy. These cases illustrate the need for caution when applying political and institutional theory within new contexts and offer new variables for future investigations of local autonomy.

Keywords: *immigration, local politics, policy distance, local autonomy, intergovernmental relations, local labor markets, South Korea*

CENTRALNO-LOKALNE MREŽE I UPRAVLJANJE IMIGRACIJOM: UDALJENOST JAVNIH POLITIKA SREDIŠNJE I LOKALNIH VLASTI U JUŽNOJ KOREJI

Sažetak

Regulacija prekograničnog protoka roba, kapitala i ljudi jedna je od bitnih značajki političke moći neke države. Međutim, središnja vlast i lokalni dužnosnici ne slažu se uvijek oko poželjnosti imigracije, jer lokalne vlasti mogu priželjkivati veći ili manji broj useljenika, ovisno o strukturi lokalnog gospodarstva i potrebi za radnicima. Unitarni oblik vlasti u Južnoj Koreji omogućava proučavanje udaljenosti javnih politika središnje vlasti, koja svoj stav prema imigraciji temelji na političkim idejama vladajuće stranke, i stavova lokalnih dužnosnika metropolitanskih gradova (onih s milijun i više stanovnika). Autorica analizira utjecaj potreba lokalnog gospodarstva na stavove lokalnih dužnosnika prema centralnoj imigracijskoj politici iz perspektive međurazinskih odnosa te koncepta autonomije odlučivanja u javnoj upravi M. Lipskyja. Usporedbom dviju lokalnih jedinica iz Južne Koreje čije su gospodarske osnove različite, ali imaju sličan stupanj lokalne autonomije, utvrđeno je da se lokalnim gospodarskim potrebama prilazi razvijajući specifične lokalne pristupe imigracijskoj politici. Suprotno očekivanjima autorice, analiza je uputila na relativnu važnost fiskalne autonomije i jedno novo poimanje političke autonomije. Pokazalo se da je potreban oprez pri primjeni političke i institucionalne teorije u različitim kontekstima, ali i nove varijable za daljnje istraživanje lokalne autonomije.

Ključne riječi: *imigracija, lokalne politike, udaljenost među javnim politikama, lokalna autonomija, odnosi pojedinih razina vlasti (međurazinski odnosi), lokalna tržišta rada, Južna Koreja*