

Fighting Governmental Corruption in Pakistan: An Evaluation of Anti-Corruption Strategies

Noor Ulain^{*}

Fiaz Hussain^{**}

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Anti-corruption efforts are required where corruption prevails and Pakistan is a developing country that is facing the menace of corruption to a considerable degree. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2019, Pakistan is ranked as 120th out of 180 countries. With this in view, this study aims to ascertain the opinion of policy professionals working at various policy institutes in Pakistan regarding the effectiveness of 26 different anti-corruption strategies by means of a self-administered

* Noor Ulain, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan (Sveučilište nacionalne obrane, Islamabad, Pakistan, e-mail: noorulain394@gmail.com).

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5077-458X>

** Fiaz Hussain, Assistant Professor, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan (docentica, Žensko sveučilište Fatima Jinnah, Rawalpindi, Pakistan e-mail: fiazhus-sain@fjwu.edu.pk).

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4214-477X>.

questionnaire. The results show slight differences between the mean scores for anti-corruption strategies, depicting a certain level of effectiveness for each strategy. Harsher punishments for corrupt persons and legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved in corruption are the strategies that had the highest mean scores of 4.07 and 4.04 respectively. The typology “Political, legal and judicial strategies” was the most effective, with the highest mean value of 3.90. A holistic approach is required in Pakistan to eradicate corruption from governmental offices.

Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption, strategies, evaluation, Pakistan

1. Introduction

Academic literature predominantly takes the view that corruption obstructs economic development (Mauro, 1995; Myint, 2000). Corruption reduces efficiency and increases inequality. It reduces economic growth and perceptibly pushes up income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi & Alonso-Terme, 2002). Estimates show that the cost of corruption amounts to more than 5 per cent of global GDP (OECD, 2014). Corruption leads to a reduction in foreign direct investment (Petrou & Thanos, 2014). It has a negative impact on human welfare because funds for the provision of services are not utilised in full and it results in poor service quality (Lambsdorf, 2001). Corruption undermines government revenue and, therefore, limits the ability of the government to invest in productivity-enhancing areas (Lopez-Claros, 2013). It also distorts decision-making connected with public investment projects (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998).

Tanzi (1998) plausibly argues that corruption will also reduce expenditure on health and education, because these are areas where it may be more difficult to collect bribes. Corruption corrodes public trust, undermines the rule of law, and ultimately delegitimises the state as well as the moral stature of the bureaucracy in the eyes of the people (Clausen, Kraay & Nyiri, 2011). According to Klitgaard (1998), the effects of corruption could extend in different directions. It could devastate economic and political development. In fact, there is really no limit to the extent to which corruption, once it is unleashed and escapes the control of the authorities, can undermine the stability of the state and organised society (Lopez-Claros, 2013).

In the light of these effects of corruption, it can be stated that corruption is a dysfunction that should be eliminated. Pakistan has seen the problem of corruption at every tier of the government system – local, provincial, and federal. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2019, released by Transparency International (TI), ranks Pakistan as 120th among 180 countries in total. At one point, in 1995, Pakistan was the second most corrupt country in the world. Moreover, the Global Corruption Barometer for 2017, also published by TI, shows that 40–50 per cent of the respondents have given a bribe to get a public service in Pakistan. The Global Competitiveness Reports (2016; 2017; 2018), released by the World Economic Forum, have declared corruption to be the primary problem when doing business in Pakistan.

The extent and magnitude of corruption in Pakistan provide the rationale for fighting it. The questions that this paper seeks to address are the following: which different strategies have been used to fight corruption and which strategies have been effective in fighting corruption in Pakistan? The paper aims to ascertain the opinion of policy professionals on the effectiveness of various anti-corruption strategies. The information obtained may be of use insofar as it will add to the knowledge and contribute to the picture of the corruption question in Pakistan. It also presents an informed reflection on the topic and should help initiate policy debate on fighting corruption in Pakistan.

The paper is organised as follows: section two provides a theoretical framework on corruption and reviews the literature on anti-corruption, section three presents the research methodology, while section four analyses the results and discusses them before the study is concluded with recommendations.

2. Theoretical Understanding of Corruption and a Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies

Defining corruption is important because it serves as guidance in developing anti-corruption strategies. Experts of all kinds are largely unanimous in seeing corruption as a global problem that requires urgent attention, yet there is no universally accepted definition of corruption. This continues to challenge policy makers in devising anti-corruption strategies, especially in an international and cross-cultural context (Abjorensen, 2014). Corruption is most often defined as the abuse or misuse of public

office for private gain (OECD, 2008; World Bank 1997).¹ A more comprehensive definition of corruption comes from TI, which sees it as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Killias, Mugellini, Isenring, & Villettaz, 2016; Osrecki, 2015). Similarly, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) of Pakistan states that “corruption involves behaviour on the part of officeholders in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed” (NACS, 2002). Khan (1996) defines corruption as a behavioural deviation from the formal rules of conduct that govern the actions of public officeholders. The focus of these definitions is on officials and their behaviour.

2.1. Theoretical Understanding of Corruption

The literature on corruption provides three paradigms to explain the nature of prevailing corruption in a specific relational context and under certain environmental circumstances. These are the economic paradigm, the cultural paradigm, and the neo-institutional paradigm (Vannucci, 2015).

Literature has discovered that anti-corruption policies are mainly motivated by and centred on an economic conceptualisation of corruption (Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015; UNDP 2015; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Johnsùn, 2012; Rose-Ackerman 1978), which necessitates reducing the chances and incentives for corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). The economic paradigm is based on the principal-agent model of corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Rose-Ackerman 1978). This theory suggests that three different parties are involved in any corruption transaction in the public sector: the principal, the agent, and a third party. The agent is supposed to look after the interests of the principal but in reality, they both may be pursuing different goals (Marquette, Flanary, Rao & Morris, 2011). The theory also focuses on the implication of trade-offs and gains (evaluated by individuals) being attributed as a result of functioning towards or against the act of corruption (Vannucci, 2015). This theory perceives corruption as a consequence of actions taken as a result of rational thinking based on a cost-benefit analysis. Given this

¹ “Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. It is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit” (World Bank, 1997, p. 8).

point of view, developing monitoring mechanisms and sanctions could be effective against corruption (Marquette & Pfeiffer, 2015).

The economic rationale for corrupt practices has been given through economic approaches towards corruption and they “model the corrupt employee as a rational actor who decides whether to engage in the corrupt activity by balancing the potential benefits against potential costs and consequences” (Morgan 1998, p. 12). Therefore, the anti-corruption strategies based on this model have emphasized public sector management issues which aim to change the incentive structure in the public sector. Despite all its merits, it only focuses on the incidence of corruption in a very specific context. It is thus argued that this perspective should be supported by other approaches (Hutchinson, 2005).

Another paradigm, the cultural paradigm, suggests that “individuals belonging to different societies and organizations can be pushed toward corruption by the nature of their internalized values and by social pressures” (Vannucci, 2015, p. 11). Whereas the economic paradigm approaches corruption as a risk versus reward and cost-benefit evaluation process, the cultural approach considers corruption based on moral values, rules, and societal norms. Studies carried out by anthropologists show that corruption is an outcome of individual-to-individual relations and their association with the system in which they live. The creation of a system can be influenced by social behaviours, distribution of power, and the setup of formal and informal rules. Therefore, the dynamics of corruption vary with time and societal setups, which suggests that corruption should be studied within a relevant context. This does not imply that corruption can be treated as a relativistic concept which is admissible in some societies but not in others. In fact, corruption is discouraged explicitly across the globe without any discrimination of cultures where it may take place, but what qualifies as corrupt may vary based on societal context (Marquette, Flanary, Rao & Morris, 2011).

Husted (1994), della Porta and Vannucci (1999; 2012), and Lambsdorff (2007) agree on the neo-institutional approach to analysing corruption. This approach has been an influential and important paradigm in political science for the last three decades (Hellman, 2015). The neo-institutional paradigm entails the aspects of both the economic approach and cultural approach which include economic incentives and moral barriers as well as the institutional framework to control corruption by regulating the effects of social interactions on the preferences of individuals. Corruption is an illegal act that cannot be imposed through state third-party mechanisms.

2.2. Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies

Corruption has been declared a multifaceted phenomenon (Ellis, 2019; Ceva & Ferretti, 2017). It involves a diversity of activities, actors, and behaviours. This makes it difficult to define corruption as a problem, but it is also difficult to design, implement, and evaluate responses to it. The diversity of definitions and proposed solutions create confusion in designing specific anti-corruption policies. Moreover, there is also poor theoretical alignment between existing forms of corruption and the measures taken to control it, and policy professionals are not aware of relevant and appropriate policy tools to counter it (Jancsics, 2019).

The progress of anti-corruption measures has been an evolutionary process which has seen different approaches evolve. In the early 1990s, the first wave to combat corruption internationally started with raising awareness through anti-corruption programmes that somehow failed due to limited focus and a technocratic approach. In the 2000s, the second wave of anti-corruption efforts came with the aim of capacity-building and skills development (Habtemichael, 2009; Michael, 2007). While formulating effective anti-corruption strategies, designers must free themselves from any bias to ensure their sustainability. Unfortunately, there is no universally acclaimed model of fighting corruption, but there are strategies to overcome it. Factors which are important in formulating anti-corruption strategies are the type of corruption, its magnitude, the agency involved, beneficiaries, victims, and the underlying reasons which promote opportunities for corruption (Habtemichael, 2009). Anti-corruption policies are considered effective when they reduce the opportunities for corruption and strengthen the social and normative barriers against it (Vannucci, 2015).

Based on the theoretical paradigms of corruption, there are many strategies to combat corruption depending on the context in which they are applied. However, it is crucial to assess the level, types, and causes of corruption before designing any anti-corruption strategy (Hanna et al., 2011; Habtemichael, 2009). Moreover, according to Riley (cited in Habtemichael, 2009), this also depends on the socioeconomic development of the country, cultural sensitivity, and the relative financial and political strengths of those who are involved in corruption. Literature provides useful and interesting typologies of anti-corruption interventions.

Huberts' (1998) survey, which sampled the opinions of experts from developed and developing countries, distinguished between six main anti-corruption typologies comprising 21 strategic methods to combat corruption. All strategies were considered effective by experts from low-

er-income countries. Based on Hurberts' (1998) work, Camerer (2001) evaluated the effectiveness of 29 anti-corruption strategies grouped into five categories. During the survey, more than 150 experts were interviewed in South Africa. The experts ranked the following eight strategies as very effective in controlling corruption: greater transparency in government tender processes, schools placing more emphasis on moral values, legal protection for whistleblowers, prosecution of high-profile individuals, barring corrupt officials from holding public office, greater financial control over/internal audits of government spending, a national anti-corruption hotline, and vigorous media investigation of corruption. Four anti-corruption strategies were ranked as least effective in curbing corruption: cross-sectoral anti-corruption conferences, increased salaries for government employees, codes of conduct to promote professional ethics, and a single independent agency to fight corruption.

Huther and Shah (2000) provide empirical evidence for selected individual anti-corruption efforts and conclude that widespread corruption is likely to be the result of multiple governance failures, which indicates that successful anti-corruption campaigns are likely to be multi-pronged. Similarly, Haarhuis and Leeuw (2004) analyse the World Bank's anti-corruption programme which integrates both top-down and bottom-up approaches. The former consists of strategies related to administrative and judicial reforms, while the latter deals with awareness strategies. It concludes that indicators need to be developed to assess the relevance of national anti-corruption policies to country-specific governance and anti-corruption conditions. Based on university students' perception, Hussain and Riaz (2012) evaluated 23 different anti-corruption strategies. Because there was very small variance among the anti-corruption strategies as viewed by the students, they were not grouped separately into effective and ineffective strategies. Instead, they were all considered as effective anti-corruption strategies which can be used to fight corruption.

The question is what strategies should be enacted to combat corruption. Anti-corruption interventions that work in one setting may not necessarily apply in another. Therefore, the success or failure of such strategies may depend on the context in which they are being implemented (Hanna et al., 2011). Valuing the context of anti-corruption interventions, the contribution of this paper is to advance the existing literature and present a case of combating corruption in Pakistan. It is based on an inventory of anti-corruption strategies available in the literature and practiced in Pakistan. Twenty-six such anti-corruption strategies have been distinguished for evaluation by policy professionals. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to construct a typology of those strategies into six meaningful and comprehensive categories.

3. Research Methods and Hypotheses

The study was conducted to obtain the opinion of policy professionals on the effectiveness of different anti-corruption strategies. The purposive sampling technique was used to ascertain the views of policy professionals. This technique involves the identification and selection of individuals or groups of individuals who are proficient and well-informed regarding a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In this research, policy professionals are the unit of analysis. In certain areas of social science research that require specialised knowledge, samples are drawn not from the general population, but rather from an allegedly knowledgeable part of the population, which serves as the universe. This so-called *policy professionals sample* has some advantages over the general public, such as concentrated knowledge or at least interest in the subject matter (Camerer, 2001). In this study, these policy professionals were sourced from different policy institutes/think tanks which have expertise in the field of governance and anti-corruption.

The data collection instrument used in the study was a close-ended questionnaire adapted from two sources (Hussain & Riaz, 2012) and Camerer (2001). It consisted of two parts: one with questions about the respondents' profile and the other containing 26 anti-corruption proposals which were graded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very ineffective to 5 = very effective. All the strategies were grouped into six categories: (1) promoting anti-corruption culture (six strategies); (2) ensuring transparency and access to information (five strategies); (3) organisational and administrative strategies (four strategies); (4) monitoring and oversight strategies (three strategies); (5) political, legal, and judicial strategies (six strategies); and (6) economic strategies (two strategies).

The data were analysed based on test value 3 for a five-point Likert scale to evaluate how respondents perceived the effectiveness of different anti-corruption strategies. The following hypotheses, equation (1) and equation (2), were formulated to be tested empirically:

$$\begin{aligned}
 H_1 &= \mu_{\text{promoting anti-corruption culture}} = \mu_{\text{ensuring transparency and access to information}} \\
 &= \mu_{\text{organizational and administrative strategies}} = \mu_{\text{monitoring and oversight strategies}} \\
 &= \mu_{\text{political, legal, and judicial strategies}} = \mu_{\text{economic strategies}} \geq 3
 \end{aligned}$$

i.e. the mean value for each category is greater than or equal to 3.

$$H_2 = \mu_{\text{strategy}} \geq 3$$

i.e. the mean value for each strategy is greater than or equal to 3.

Here, the mean value scored above the test value 3 will show the effectiveness of that strategy or category, as the case may be. If the value for any strategy was found to be less than 3, the strategy was assumed to be ineffective.

After passing through validity and reliability tests at pilot testing stage, data were collected from policy professionals at twelve policy institutes/think tanks.² Out of 125 questionnaires, 105 were returned. To achieve accurate and authentic results, questionnaires must be completed properly. Five questionnaires out of 105 were either incomplete or they had not been completed by the targeted persons from the policy desks; hence they were excluded from further proceedings. The response rate was 80 per cent. This study did not require names or the personal identity of the respondents and participation in the study was completely anonymous and voluntary. The respondents were informed that the information gathered from them would be used exclusively for research purposes, their identity would not be disclosed and the institute they belong to would not be used as a unit of analysis in the study.

Before analysing the data, the reliability was checked by applying Cronbach's Alpha Reliability test on anti-corruption strategies in Pakistan (Table 1). The calculated value .907 is above 0.5, which confirms the reliability of the data.

Table 1: Cronbach's Alpha on Anti-Corruption Strategies in Pakistan

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	Number of Items
.907	26

Source: Authors' calculation.

² The following policy institutes/think tanks were approached: Center for Peace and Development Institutions (CPDI), Free And Fair Election Network (FAFEN), Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency (PILDAT), Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Studies (PIPS), Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Policy Research Institute of Market Economy (PRIME), Jinnah Institute, Center for Policy Studies, Governance Institutes Network International (GINI), and Institute of Social and Policy Sciences (I-SAPS).

The data were further analysed by means of descriptive and inferential statistics, using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20. Descriptive tests were applied to the first part of the survey which refers to the demographics of the respondents. The descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A. Frequencies were calculated in descriptive tests that analyse the ratio of male to female respondents, their age group, qualifications, and work experience.

A one-way ANOVA was applied to check the impact of demographics on the level of effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies classified into six categories. To analyse the evaluation of anti-corruption strategies, a one-sample t-test was applied to analyse the means of anti-corruption strategies on the test-value 3. It was analysed whether the mean value for each strategy was above the test value or below the test value. Values that lie above the test value were interpreted to mean that strategies are effective in curbing corruption.

4. Findings and Discussion

Demographic statistics reveal that 54 per cent of the respondents were male and 46 per cent were female. The majority of the respondents (57 per cent) were young policy professionals, 21–30 years of age; 36 per cent were 31–40 years old; 4 per cent were 41–50 years old; and 3 per cent were 50+ years old. These percentages show that the participants included both young policy professionals and experienced ones with advanced knowledge in the field of study.

The demographics further revealed that the respondents were highly qualified because the majority (40 per cent) had a master's degree (16 years of education), while 35 per cent of the respondents had a MPhil qualification (18 years of education), 18 per cent held a bachelor's degree, and 4 per cent of the respondents had a PhD.

As far as the respondents' work experience is concerned, the majority of policy professionals (53 per cent) had fewer than 5 years of experience, 30 per cent had 6–10 years of experience, 8 per cent had 11–15 years of experience, 5 per cent had 16–20 years of experience, and 4 per cent of policy professionals had over 20 years of work experience. A summary of the respondents' demographics data is given in Table 2.

Table 2: *Summary of Demographics of Respondents (Policy Professionals)*

Gender		Age	
Description	Percentage	Description	Percentage
Male	54	21–30	57
Female	46	31–40	36
Over 50		41–50	4
		3	
Qualification		Work Experience	
Description	Percentage	Description	Percentage
Bachelor's	18	Less than 5 years	53
Master's	40	6–10 years	30
MS/MPhil	35	11–15 years	8
PhD	4	16–20 years	5
Any Other	3	21–25 years	2
		Over 25 years	2

Source: Authors' calculations.

The results of the one-way ANOVA based on age, qualification and gender show that policy professionals with 21–25 years of work experience believe that economic strategies are ineffective, whereas the rest of the policy professionals evaluate these strategies as effective. Policy professionals with less than 20 years of work experience evaluate political, legal and judicial strategies as the most effective strategies to reduce the level of corruption. Respondents with over 20 years of work experience assess these strategies as ineffective in eradicating corruption. Strategies in the “Monitoring and oversight” category are graded as effective by all qualified policy professionals. However, policy professionals with a PhD judged them to be highly effective, while policy professionals with a bachelor's degree rated these strategies as less effective.

The means plot also shows that age plays a part in how effective anti-corruption strategies are seen to be. Policy professionals from all age groups think that “Ensuring transparency and access to information strategies”

and “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” are more effective at reducing the level of corruption.

All the strategies were grouped in six categories and a one-sample t-test was applied to the computed means for these categories. Each of the categories’ means obtained by the t-test was analysed against the test value 3. The one-sample t-test results for all categories are reported in Table 3. The results reveal that “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” are believed to be highly important in eradicating corruption, with the highest mean value of 3.90. “Ensuring transparency and access to information strategies” had a mean value of 3.84, while “Organisational and administrative strategies” had a mean value of 3.73, showing the need for a transparent mechanism to cope with corruption. “Monitoring and oversight strategies” and “Economic strategies” had a mean value of 3.69 and 3.60 respectively. “Promoting anti-corruption culture strategies” had the lowest mean score of 3.55. As all the categories received a mean score of above 3, this proves the acceptance of H1.

Table 3: Summary of One-Sample t-test on Anti-Corruption Categories

		One Sample Statistics		
	Typologies	t-statistic	Mean	Mean Difference
1	Promoting anti-corruption culture	7.98*	3.55	.55
2	Ensuring transparency and access to information	9.34*	3.84	.84
3	Organisational and administrative strategies	10.16*	3.73	.73
4	Monitoring and oversight strategies	9.03*	3.69	.69
5	Political, legal, and judicial strategies	12.05*	3.90	.90
6	Economic strategies	7.04*	3.60	.60

*Significant at 1% level

Source: Authors’ calculation.

The frequencies of policy professionals' opinions can be found in Appendix B. By using a one-sample t-test to calculate the mean value for each strategy, the study found the mean score for each strategy to be above the test value (3). This shows that none of the strategies are ineffective. Hence H2 is also accepted. Every strategy proposed in the study got weightage from the policy professionals for its effectiveness in fighting governmental corruption. Table 4 shows the values obtained by the one-sample t-test for all the strategies.

The results show that there are slight differences among the mean scores for all 26 anti-corruption strategies, which range from 3.30 to 4.07.

Table 4: Evaluation of Anti-Corruption Strategies through One Sample Statistics on Test Value 3

	Typologies	Anti-Corruption Strategies	Mean
S1	Promoting anti-corruption culture strategies	Education curriculum placing greater emphasis on moral values	3.50
S2		Religious community placing greater emphasis on promoting moral values in everyday life	3.43
S3		A public awareness campaign to sensitise the general public regarding the evils of corruption	3.57
S4		Codes of conduct to promote professional ethics in the public sector	3.64
S5		Regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all sectors and stakeholders	3.30
S6		More research on the causes, nature and extent of corruption	3.84
S7	Ensuring transparency and access to information strategies	Greater access to government information	3.93
S8		Greater transparency of political funding	3.97
S9		Disclosure by civil servants and politicians of their assets and income	3.82
S10		Greater transparency of government tendering / procurement procedures	3.77
S11		Promoting investigative journalism to investigate corruption related cases	3.69

S12	Organisational and administrative strategies	Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government spending	3.85
S13		Blacklisting businesses/NGOs proved to be involved in corruption	3.86
S14		Rationalisation of discretionary powers of government servants	3.70
S15	Monitoring and oversight strategies	Establishment of a single independent anti-corruption agency to fight corruption	3.52
S16		Establishment of a watchdog institution to keep an eye on the implementation of anti-corruption strategies by anti-corruption agencies	3.68
S17		Increase the ability of parliament to oversee the activities of the government	3.64
S18		Establishment of a national anti-corruption hotline for reporting and addressing fraudulent cases	3.77
S19	Political, legal, and judicial strategies	Establishment of special accountability courts to hear cases regarding corruption	3.73
S20		More resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases	3.74
S21		Introducing harsher punishments for persons involved in corruption	4.07
S22		Legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved in corruption	4.04
S23		Increased political will to fight corruption	3.87
S24		Barring corrupt officials from holding public office	3.96
S25	Economic strategies	Incentivising employees of anti-corruption agencies dealing with corruption related cases	3.60
S26		Increasing wages of public sector employees	3.60

Source: Authors' calculations.

In the category of “Political, legal, and judicial strategies”, “increased political will to fight corruption”³ had the highest mean score (3.87), and at 40 per cent, a very effective percentage. There seems to be a consensus in the corruption literature that without strong political will, anti-corruption reforms are bound to fail (Williams & Doig, 2004; Kpundeh, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2000; Pope & Vogl, 2000). Since 1947 many laws have been introduced in Pakistan to combat corruption, such as the Prevention Corruption Act of 1947 and the National Accountability Ordinance of 1999. Furthermore, anti-corruption agencies and accountability bodies are operational to control corruption. Recently, the federal government has introduced amendments to the National Accountability Ordinance through a presidential ordinance⁴ because the federal government does not have a simple majority in the senate (second house of parliament) and has been unable to develop a consensus on accountability legislation. Governments in Pakistan have shown their resolve to combat corruption, but anti-corruption efforts have always been maligned as political victimisation and engineering to target political opponents.

The “Ensuring transparency and access to information strategies” category focuses both on access to information and transparency. Transparency is considered one of the most important tools in fighting corruption (Kuunifaa, 2012; Sturges, 2007). It is defined as the disclosure of government information and its use by the public, so it requires a public that can access, understand, and use the information it receives from the government (Ginsberg et al., 2012). It provides a basis for government accountability and creates barriers against fraudulent interventions (Loch & Lumumba, 2014). For the promotion of transparency and accountability, FOI (Freedom of Information) laws are critical tools.⁵ They confer on the public the legal right to ask for and receive information held by public bodies. However, the enforceability of FOI laws is what sets it apart from general pledges of access to information made by governments (Holsen, 2007). Both the federal and provincial governments in Pakistan

³ Political will refers to the sincerity of a government’s pledge to control corruption both in words and deeds. For details see Abdulai, (2009).

⁴ The National Accountability (Amendment) Ordinance 2019

⁵ The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 under art.19 states: “Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, commission or incitement to an offence.”

have promulgated FOI laws. In 2002, Pakistan introduced its first FOI law. Presently, Pakistan has five independent Right to Information (RTI) Acts, at the federal level⁶ and in its four provinces.⁷ However, these laws have not been implemented in their true spirit.

The “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” category had the mean value of 3.90. Among individual strategies, “introducing harsher punishments for persons involved in corruption” had the highest mean value (4.07). If the institutional environment is not supportive, it is difficult to implement harsher punishments to reduce the level of corruption (Becker, 1968). Pakistan does not have capital punishment for persons proven guilty of corruption. China, a neighbouring country, is among the few countries that have introduced the death penalty for persons convicted of corruption; however, corruption is still not effectively deterred in China. Studies like those by Becker and Stigler (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978) conclude from their models that to be effective, penalties need to be tied to the marginal benefits of the received gains from corruption (Haarhuis & Leeuw 2004, p. 559).

An institutional environment can be created where whistleblowers who inform about corrupt officials are protected. The anti-corruption strategy of legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved in corruption (found in the “Political, legal, and judicial strategies” category) had the mean value of 4.04. There should be legal protection for whistleblowers informing about corrupt practices. Whistleblowing is defined as an act of an individual within an organisation who discloses information in order to report and correct corruption. Many countries have recognised its importance as an effective tool in exposing corruption and have introduced legislation whereby whistleblowers are provided legal protection from reprisals or retaliation (Schultz & Harutyunyan, 2015). Because, if they are not given security, they will not report against corruption (Pope, 1996). The federal government in Pakistan has recently introduced legislation on the establishment of the Whistleblower Protection and Vigilance Commission of 2019. The laws ensure protection and monetary incentives for citizens reporting corruption.

The anti-corruption strategy of “barring corrupt officials from holding public office”, found in “Political, legal, and judicial strategies”, had a

⁶ Right of Access to Information Act 2017.

⁷ Baluchistan Freedom of Information Ordinance 2005, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa RTI Act, 2013, Punjab Transparency and the Right to Information Act, 2013, and Sindh Transparency and RTI Act, 2017.

mean value of 3.96. Thirty-seven per cent (37%) of policy professionals considered it a very effective measure to combat corruption. Camerer (2001) views it as a comparatively simple strategy to administer. In Pakistan, under Section 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) of 2002, proven corrupt persons are disqualified from running in elections or holding public office for a period of ten years. The anti-corruption strategy of “greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government spending”, in the category of “Organisational and administrative strategies”, had a mean score of 3.85, with 40 per cent of policy professionals considering it very effective. According to Bowles (2000), making the financial management system more transparent and accountable reduces the chances of corruption occurring (Haarhuis & Leeuw, 2004).

“Incentivising employees of anti-corruption agencies dealing with corruption-related cases” and “increasing the wages of public sector employees”, both in the category of “Economic strategies”, scored the same mean value of 3.60. Rauch and Evans (2000) found an increased level of corruption due to an increase in wages, but in Pakistan’s context, Hussain and Riaz (2012) found low wages to be a major cause of corruption. Need-based corruption as opposed to greed-based corruption may be controlled by increasing the wage level and incentivising anti-corruption officials.

The category of “Monitoring and oversight strategies” had a mean value of 3.69. Regarding individual strategies, the “establishment of a national anti-corruption hotline for reporting and addressing fraudulent cases” scored a mean value of 3.77. In Pakistan, the NAB has established a fraud and anti-corruption hotline, UAN 111-NAB-NAB (111-622-622), whose purpose it is to receive telephone complaints against corruption and corrupt practices (NAB, 2007). Transparency International Pakistan, in collaboration with the US Agency for International Development (USAID), has established an anti-fraud hotline (0800-84700) (USAID, 2019). In public service delivery organisations, a complaint hotline as a formal accountability mechanism for citizens has reduced corruption (Caseley, 2003), but the effectiveness of supra anti-corruption hotlines has yet to be established in reducing corruption.

Furthermore, the “establishment of a single independent anti-corruption agency to fight corruption” may not serve as a panacea for a widespread and systemic problem. There is also a feeling that a range of institutions with an anti-corruption mandate provide checks and balances and ensures that there is no single all-powerful agency which might become the political police of the ruling party. It may be used for political victimisation, as the NAB has been accused of this in the past (Hussain, 2011). Anti-cor-

ruption agencies are not appropriate in countries where the chance of abuse is high (Huther & Shah, 2000; Klitgaard, 1988). In Pakistan, different of anti-corruption agencies were raised from time to time. Pakistan inherited the Special Police Establishment, replaced by the Federal Investigation Agency in 1975. The Ehtesab Commission was established in 1996. The Ehtesab Bureau supplemented its functions, as the former was entrusted with investigations, whereas the latter undertook prosecutions. The NAB was established in 1999 and charged with the responsibility of eliminating corruption by means of a holistic approach of awareness, prevention, and enforcement. Anti-Corruption Establishments (ACEs) exist in each province.

To conclude, each strategy scored a mean value above the test value 3, which is to say that each strategy has a certain level of effectiveness and not a single strategy can be said to be ineffective. In the end, policy professionals were also asked to suggest anti-corruption strategies apart from the 26 included in the questionnaire. They suggested stronger monitoring and evaluation of government activities, as well as proper enforcement of laws and punishment as envisioned in the laws. Policy professionals suggested the strengthening of a transparency and accountability mechanism and the independence of anti-corruption agencies from political interference. Furthermore, it was also suggested that anti-corruption laws should be properly implemented across the board, without any discrimination or favours.

5. Conclusion

Policy professionals believe that each strategy has a certain level of effectiveness in eradicating corruption, but the problem that renders these strategies ineffective lies in their implementation. Political will is required for the implementation of anti-corruption strategies to curb corruption (Abdulai, 2009). Corruption cannot be eradicated by just applying one or two strategies. A collective action approach must be adopted by the government and concerned anti-corruption bodies to overcome corruption. Sensitising people to the evils of corruption, punishments for engaging in corrupt activities, and giving protection to whistleblowers are the first steps. A fair judiciary must gain public trust and there should be no discrimination while investigating and prosecuting corruption cases against any high profile officials. For these strategies to be properly implemented, an independent body should be responsible for keeping an eye on the

efforts made by anti-corruption agencies to undermine corruption. When policy professionals were asked to suggest another strategy, many stated the same strategies as included in the questionnaire but with a focus on the implementation mechanism.

The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any anti-corruption strategy depends on the political structure of the country and the implementation mechanism therein. Man-wai (2006) suggests that to develop an effective anti-corruption design, the external and internal environment should be scanned to determine the system that exists and the conditions where the problem lies. A single anti-corruption strategy may not serve as a panacea in an environment where corruption is rampant and ingrained in the system. Some other factors required to implement strategies effectively and to get positive results are: adequate resources, capacity building of anti-corruption agencies, meritocracy, and limited discretionary powers. Anti-corruption now has broader connotations. It is more than transparency and accountability. Anti-corruption is subject to good governance.

This research has several limitations. Analysing the ratio of age and work experience of policy professionals revealed that the majority have less than 5 years of work experience and majority of them are less than 40 years old. This can be taken as both a limitation and an advantage to the study. Less experienced, young policy professionals can present a limitation to the study as it can be said that less experienced persons cannot evaluate solutions to corruption. On the other hand, it can be seen as an advantage because new employees can bring greater change and fresh graduates can deal with issues in effective and creative ways. Despite the limitations to the study, the information obtained may be of some use by adding to the existing knowledge and contributing to the picture of the corruption question in Pakistan. It presents, at the very least, an informed and educated reflection. The perceived priorities of policy professionals should not be used as the only basis for policy interventions. These findings could be used together with other sources of information in order to promote a more informed approach to the problem of fighting corruption in Pakistan.

A lack of literature on anti-corruption strategies with reference to Pakistan suggests that more research is needed on anti-corruption. This study can be further taken as an evaluation of the present anti-corruption mechanism in Pakistan, as it mainly focuses on the evaluation of anti-corruption strategies. Therefore, more detailed research can be conducted to find out why anti-corruption efforts have failed to address the problem of corruption.

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FIGHTING GOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION IN PAKISTAN: AN EVALUATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES

Summary

Corruption remains a persistent problem in both developed and developing countries. Statistics provide evidence that Pakistan faces the menace of corruption. The recently released Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2019 by Transparency International (TI) ranks Pakistan as the 120th country out of a total of 180. In 1995 Pakistan used to be the second most corrupt country in the world. Moreover, TI's Global Corruption Barometer for 2017 shows that 40–50 per cent of the respondents have given a bribe to get a public service in Pakistan. The Global Competitiveness Reports (2016, 2017, and 2018) released by the World Economic Forum in Switzerland have declared corruption to be the topmost problematic factor when doing business in Pakistan. Corruption is a public problem and relevant academic literature holds the dominant view that it obstructs economic development. It increases the direct costs of firms through bribery. It encourages bureaucratic red tape and corrupts the institutions of contract enforcement and property rights protection. Although corruption and anti-corruption have long been research topics in the social sciences, little has been done about the evaluation of anti-corruption strategies. Anti-corruption efforts are required where corruption prevails. With this in view, the study aims to ascertain the opinion of policy professionals regarding different anti-corruption strategies. Data on 26 anti-corruption strategies were collected through a self-administered questionnaire from 100 policy professionals working in 12 different policy institutes. The results have found slight differences between the mean scores for anti-corruption strategies, depicting a certain level of effectiveness for each strategy. Harsher punishments for corrupt persons and legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved in corruption are the strategies that had the highest mean scores of 4.07 and 4.04 respectively. Policy professionals rated the category of "Political, legal and judicial strategies" with the highest mean value of 3.90 as

the most effective anti-corruption typology. A holistic approach is required in Pakistan to eradicate corruption from governmental offices.

Keywords: *corruption, anti-corruption, strategies, evaluation, Pakistan*

PAKISTANSKA BORBA PROTIV KORUPCIJE: EVALUACIJA ANTIKORUPCIJSKIH STRATEGIJA

Sažetak

Korupcija je i dalje prisutna i u razvijenim zemljama i u onima u razvoju. Statistički pokazatelji upućuju na to da se i u Pakistanu javlja problem korupcije. Prema indeksu percepcije korupcije koji je organizacija Transparency International (TI) objavila 2019., Pakistan se nalazi na 120. mjestu od ukupno 180 država, dok je 1995. bio druga najkorumpiranija država na svijetu. Podaci TI-jeva globalnoga korupcijskog barometra iz 2017. pokazuju da je 40-50 % pakistanskih ispitanika nekoga podmitilo kako bi zauzvrat dobilo javnu uslugu. Nadalje, u svojim je izvješćima o globalnoj konkurentnosti iz 2016., 2017. i 2018. švicarski Svjetski ekonomski forum problem korupcije stavio na prvo mjesto kada je riječ o poslovanju u Pakistanu. U literaturi prevladava stav da korupcija, osim što je riječ o javnom problemu, ograničava i ekonomski razvoj. Podmićivanje povećava izravne troškove poduzeća, a pod utjecajem korupcije buja suvišna birokracija te pati provedba ugovora i zaštita imovinskih prava. Iako su i problem korupcije i antikorupcija već dugo predmeti društvenih istraživanja, nedovoljno su se dosad bavila procjenom antikorupcijskih strategija. Ondje gdje je prisutna korupcija, potrebne su i antikorupcijske mjere. Cilj je rada utvrditi mišljenje stručnjaka za javne politike o različitim antikorupcijskim strategijama. Upitnikom je prikupljeno mišljenje 100 stručnjaka iz 13 različitih instituta o ukupno 26 antikorupcijskih strategija. Rezultati su pokazali manje razlike između srednjih vrijednosti za različite antikorupcijske strategije te je zabilježena određena razina učinkovitosti za svaku strategiju. Antikorupcijske strategije za koje su dobivene najviše srednje vrijednosti rezultata ispitanika jesu uvođenje strožih kazna za korumpirane osobe (4,04) i zakonska zaštita za zviždače koji upozoravaju na osobe koje sudjeluju u koruptivnim radnjama (4,07). Stručnjaci za javne politike ocijenili su kategoriju naziva „Političke, pravne i pravosudne strategije” najuspješnijom antikorupcijskom kategorijom (najviša srednja vrijednost 3,90). Potreban je holistički pristup iskorjenjivanju korupcije iz javne uprave.

Ključne riječi: *korupcija, antikorupcija, strategije, procjena, Pakistan*

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics of Anti-Corruption Typologies

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Promoting anti-corruption culture	100	1.83	4.83	3.55	.68
Ensuring transparency and access to information	100	1.40	5.00	3.84	.89
Organisational and administrative strategies	100	1.75	5.00	3.73	.72
Monitoring and oversight strategies	100	1.00	5.00	3.69	.77
Political, legal and judicial strategies	100	1.50	5.00	3.90	.74
Economic strategies	100	1.00	5.00	3.60	.85
Valid N	100				

Source: Authors' calculations.

Appendix B. Frequency of Policy Professionals' Opinion on Anti-Corruption Strategies

Sr#	Very ineffective (%)	Ineffective (%)	Moderately effective (%)	Effective (%)	Very effective (%)	Majority
S1	6	11	31	31	21	Effective
S2	9	11	28	32	20	Effective
S3	4	9	28	44	15	Effective
S4	4	10	25	40	21	Effective
S5	3	17	38	31	11	Effective
S6	2	10	23	32	33	Effective
S7	4	8	15	37	36	Effective

S8	4	6	20	29	41	Effective
S9	5	9	22	27	37	Effective
S10	5	10	20	33	32	Effective
S11	3	13	24	32	28	Effective
S12	6	9	19	26	40	Effective
S13	6	9	16	31	38	Effective
S14	1	9	27	45	18	Effective
S15	6	10	25	44	15	Effective
S16	4	8	26	40	22	Effective
S17	3	11	25	41	20	Effective
S18	2	5	32	36	25	Effective
S19	5	7	21	44	23	Effective
S20	5	5	19	53	18	Effective
S21	7	4	12	29	48	Effective
S22	5	4	12	40	39	Effective
S23	3	14	16	27	40	Effective
S24	5	5	16	37	37	Effective
S25	2	11	29	41	17	Effective
S26	2	17	23	35	23	Effective

Source: Authors' calculations.

Appendix C. *Survey Questionnaire*

Part I

- Gender** a. Male b. Female
- Age** a. 21–30 c. 31–40 d. 41–50
- e. Over 50
- Qualification** a. Bachelor's b. Master's c. MS/M.Phil
- d. PhD e. Any other
- Work Experience** a. Less than 5 years b. 6–10 years c. 11–15 years
- d. 16–20 years e. 21–25 years f. Over 25 years

Part II

The following are anti-corruption strategies to eliminate corruption. Please say for each proposed strategy whether you think it would be very effective, effective, moderately effective, ineffective or very ineffective at reducing corruption in Pakistan.

1. Education curriculum placing greater emphasis on moral values

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

2. Religious community placing greater emphasis on promoting moral values in everyday life

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

3. A public awareness campaign to sensitise the general public about the evils of corruption

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

4. Codes of conduct to promote professional ethics in the public sector

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

5. Increased political will to fight corruption

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

6. Greater access to government information

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

7. Greater transparency of political funding

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

8. More research on the causes, nature and extent of corruption

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective
- d. Effective
- e. Very effective

9. Regular anti-corruption conferences that bring together all sectors and stakeholders

- a. Very ineffective
- b. Ineffective
- c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

10. Disclosure by civil servants and politicians of their income and assets

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

11. Greater transparency of government tendering / procurement procedures

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

12. Promoting investigative journalism to investigate corruption related cases

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

13. Incentivising employees of anti-corruption agencies dealing with corruption related cases

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

14. Increasing wages of public sector employees

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

15. Greater internal financial controls and internal audits of government spending

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

16. Blacklisting businesses /NGOs proved to be involved in corruption

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

17. Rationalisation of discretionary powers of public office holders

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

18. Barring corrupt officials from holding public office

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

19. Establishment of a single independent anti-corruption agency to fight corruption

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective

d. Effective e. Very effective

20. Establishment of a watchdog institution to keep an eye on the implementation of anti-corruption strategies by anti-corruption agencies

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

21. Increase the ability of parliament to oversee the activities of the government

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

22. Establishment of a national anti-corruption hotline for reporting and addressing of fraudulent cases

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

23. Establishment of special accountability courts to hear cases regarding corruption

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

24. More resources to investigate and prosecute corruption cases

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

25. Introducing harsher punishments for persons involved in corruption

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

26. Legal protection for whistleblowers informing about persons involved in corruption

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective

27. Any other anti-corruption strategy suggested by you. Also rate the level of effectiveness.

a. Very ineffective b. Ineffective c. Moderately effective
d. Effective e. Very effective