Corruption Risk Maps as a Solution for the Management of Resources in the Context of Environmental Disasters

Guillermo Boscán; Pablo Biderbost; Eduardo Muñoz Suárez; Nalia Rochin

Guillermo Boscán University of Salamanca https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4199-2160
Pablo Biderbost Comillas Pontifical University https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4086-3658
Eduardo Muñoz Suárez University of Italian Switzerland
Nalia Rochin BB&R https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9604-6158

Keywords: Risk management, Corruption, Natural disasters, Paraguay

Abstract

Corruption in the public sector is an elusive and opaque phenomenon. Government reaction to disasters and its consequent investment in economic resources constitute a favourable opportunity for nepotism, embezzlement and other criminal situations. Detection of these scenarios requires the application of sophisticated methodologies that should be incorporated into the processes of disaster risk management. The use of corruption risk maps has been put forward as a potential solution to this problem. This technique acts as a disincentive to corrupt behaviour in government processes through collective and agreed anticipation of acts of corruption. Corruption may happen at all levels of government, given that economic resources for disaster relief are distributed at municipal, provincial and national levels. This tool helps detect and measure incidents of corruption in government processes and simultaneously designs and executes corrective mechanisms. This paper discusses the advantages derived from the analogue and digital application of this instrument, presenting the requirements for its use, its potential and future challenges. The identification of benefits has been made possible by the incremental application of the tool within the framework of a process of institutional transformation of the national government in Paraguay with the institutional and financial support of UNDOC and USAID.

Author Biographies

Guillermo Boscán, University of Salamanca

Assistant Professor at the University of Salamanca. Specialises in quantitative research methods and electoral processes. He has been a consultant for the EU, UNDP, EULAC Foundation, IOM, the Joint United Nations Programme on Human Security and IADB. Campus Miguel de Unamuno s/n, Faculty of Law, Salamanca, 37007, Spain.

Pablo Biderbost, Comillas Pontifical University

Professor at the Department of International Relations of the Comillas Pontifical University. Specialising in public innovation and anti-corruption strategies. He has been a consultant for the Council of Europe, EU, EULAC Foundation, IADB, the World Bank, UNDP, UNODC, USAID, UNESCO and IOM. Comillas Pontifical University, Alberto Aguilera 3, 28049 Madrid, Spain.

Nalia Rochin, BB&R

Founder member of the consultancy firm BB&R. Professor of the Autonomous University of Baja California. She specialises in public innovation and cooperation for development. She has been a consultant for the EU, UNDP, IADB and the Joint United Nations Programme on Human Security. BB&R Office, Gran Vía, 59, Salamanca 37001, Spain.