Analysis of the 1961 Constitution in the Pendulum of Democracy and Guardianship in Turkey

Sažetak

This study systematically analyses the 1961 Turkish Constitution, which was
established after the 1960 military coup, by examining its dual structure within
the framework of democracy and military tutelage. Using the PRISMA method
for systematic literature review and AMOS 22 for qualitative content analysis
of expert opinions from YouTube videos, it investigates how this Constitution
balances democratic freedoms with institutionalised tutelage. The 1961 Constitution
is recognised for expanding fundamental rights, establishing judicial independence,
and introducing the concept of a social state, significantly advancing
democratic standards in Turkey. It comprehensively guaranteed individual,
social, and economic rights, ensured judicial autonomy, and supported freedoms
such as unionisation and collective bargaining. However, the same Constitution
institutionalised military control and embedded military influence in civilian
politics through the establishment of tutelage bodies such as the Senate of the
Republic and the National Security Council, which were composed of partially
appointed and ex officio members. Measures such as executive decrees and
state control over broadcasting further reflected elements of tutelage. The tutelary
structures constrained democratic governance by establishing checks on elected
civilian authorities. Content analysis of expert discussions revealed critical perspectives
that emphasised that the Constitution did not sufficiently reflect the
will of the people due to its formation process under military influence. Experts
emphasised the role of institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the National
Security Council as entities that perpetuated bureaucratic and military
tutelage rather than fully protecting democratic principles. The study highlights
the internal contradictions in the 1961 Constitution, showing how it oscillates
between strengthening democracy and strengthening tutelage. This dichotomy reflects
Turkey’s broader political tension between civilian democratic aspirations
and persistent bureaucratic-military influence. The study argues that for a strong
democratic evolution, future constitutional reforms must eliminate the remaining
tutelary structures, ensure a clear alignment with democratic governance, and
reflect popular sovereignty.